

# **Sharing the Pie: Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market**

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## Table of Contents

<b>Preface</b>		xxiii
<b>Part I</b>		
<b>Introduction: Sharing the Pie</b>		
<b>Chapter 1:</b>	<b>Introduction: “Sharing the Pie”</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1.	Introduction: The issue	3
1.1.1.	The territorially restricted fiscal sovereignty in an era of globalization calls for an international tax regime	3
1.1.2.	The current international tax regime was developed nearly a century ago	5
1.1.2.1.	The regime’s purpose: Geographically locating profits generated	5
1.1.2.2.	The building blocks of a typical corporate tax	6
1.1.2.3.	The success of the 1920s Compromise	14
1.1.3.	The international tax regime has become outdated and flawed	15
1.1.3.1.	The international tax regime has become outdated	15
1.1.3.2.	The international tax regime has come to operate arbitrarily as a consequence	16
1.1.3.3.	The international tax regime has become unfair	18
1.1.4.	The distortions categorized: “Obstacles”, “disparities” and “inadequacies”	20
1.1.4.1.	Distortions: The influence of taxation on corporate behaviour	20
1.1.4.2.	Arbitrary allocation of tax to taxpayers: “Obstacles” and “disparities”	20
1.1.4.3.	Arbitrary allocation of tax among countries: “Inadequacies”	24
1.2.	The research question: “Corporate tax 2.0?”	30
1.3.	The approach taken to finding an answer	33
1.3.1.	Seeking a normative framework	33
1.3.2.	Part II: Chapter 2 – Some thoughts on fairness in corporate taxation	36

## Table of Contents

---

1.3.3.	Part III: Chapter 3 – Towards a fair international tax regime: Eliminating obstacles	38
1.3.4.	Part IV: Chapters 4 through 6 – Towards a fair international tax regime: Eliminating disparities adequately	40
1.3.4.1.	General remarks	40
1.3.4.2.	Chapter 4 – The group as a taxable entity	42
1.3.4.3.	Chapter 5 – Economic rents as taxable base	43
1.3.4.4.	Chapter 6 – In search of an allocation mechanism	44
1.3.5.	Part V: Chapter 7 – Sharing the pie: Building blocks for a “corporate tax 2.0”	46
1.3.6.	Drawing from and building on earlier publications by the author	46
<b>Part II</b>		
<b>Some Thoughts on Fairness in Corporate Taxation</b>		
<b>Chapter 2:</b>	<b>Some Thoughts on Fairness in Corporate Taxation</b>	<b>51</b>
2.1.	Introduction	51
2.2.	Conditions for a fair allocation of tax on business income in a globalizing economy	52
2.2.1.	The allocation of corporate tax should be equitable and economically efficient	52
2.2.1.1.	A corporate tax should also be fair	52
2.2.1.2.	Fairness in tax theory corresponds to the notions underlying the European Union	58
2.2.2.	What does equity mean?	62
2.2.2.1.	The obligation to contribute to the financing of public expenditure	62
2.2.2.2.	Inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity	64
2.2.3.	What does economic efficiency mean?	72
2.2.3.1.	Tax should not affect economic decisions	72
2.2.3.2.	Neutrality in corporate taxation matches equality in corporate taxation	77
2.2.3.3.	Pursuing worldwide economic efficiency	79
2.2.4.	Administrative convenience: Getting rid of the red tape	80

2.3.	Fairness requires international coordination, but fiscal sovereignty	81
2.3.1.	International coordination required	81
2.3.2.	Suggestions and proposals forwarded for a corporate tax 2.0 by others	83
2.3.3.	What about fiscal sovereignty...	87
2.4.	Final remarks	89
 <b>Part III</b> <b>Towards a Fair International Tax Regime: Eliminating Obstacles</b>		
<b>Chapter 3:</b>	<b>Towards a Fair International Tax Regime: Eliminating Obstacles</b>	<b>95</b>
3.1.	Introduction	95
3.2.	What standard should be required for an international tax system to be “fair”?	98
3.2.1.	General remarks	98
3.2.2.	Fairness within the system: Tax competence at state level, disparities as a given	99
3.2.3.	Equity within the international tax system of a state	100
3.2.3.1.	The benefits principle and the ability-to-pay principle within the international tax system of a state	100
3.2.3.2.	Equity requires that a tax border crossing has no effect on the overall tax burden imposed by a state	101
3.2.3.3.	Market equality principle in EU law requires the same treatment	102
3.2.4.	Tax neutrality within the international tax system of a state	110
3.2.4.1.	Economic efficiency within the international tax system of a state	110
3.2.4.2.	Tax neutrality requires that a tax border crossing has no effect on the overall tax burden imposed by a state	111
3.2.4.3.	Market neutrality principle in EU law requires the same treatment	112
3.2.4.4.	Concepts of export neutrality and import neutrality both unilaterally distort	116

## Table of Contents

---

3.3.	Fairness within an international tax system: Internal equity and production factor neutrality	135
3.3.1.	Tax burden should not affect residence location and investment location	135
3.3.2.	Worldwide taxation in the event of a domestic nexus: Double tax relief in the form of a credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income regarding a foreign nexus	138
3.3.2.1.	Worldwide taxation if domestic nexus, irrespective of tax place of residence	138
3.3.2.2.	Double tax relief regarding foreign nexus: credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income to render investment location indifferent regarding tax burden imposed	139
3.3.2.3.	Identical tax systems hypothesized at both sides of the tax border to exclude disparities from the analysis: Internal consistency	140
3.3.2.4.	Disregarding the effects at the other side of the tax border to demonstrate the presence or absence of an obstacle in an international tax system of a state	141
3.4.	The operation of the Dutch double tax relief mechanism explained	144
3.4.1.	The Dutch double tax relief mechanism's operation in general	144
3.4.1.1.	Two-step approach akin to second limitation in common ordinary credit method	144
3.4.1.2.	Some numerical exercises: Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company	147
3.4.2.	Foreign and domestic-source losses: Cross-border loss set-off	151
3.4.2.1.	The "recapture of foreign losses" and the "carry-forward of foreign profits"	151
3.4.2.2.	The recapture of foreign losses mechanism	152
3.4.2.3.	The carry-forward of foreign profits mechanism: Domestic-source losses	154
3.4.3.	Notional services provided, notional supplies of goods (stock and capital assets)	155
3.4.3.1.	Intra-firm transactions	155
3.4.3.2.	Intra-firm provisions of services	160
3.4.3.3.	Intra-firm supplies of goods (stock transfers)	162
3.4.3.4.	Intra-firm supplies of goods (capital asset transfers)	165

3.4.4.	Currency exchange results	172
3.4.4.1.	Allocation of currency exchange <i>pro rata parte</i>	172
3.4.4.2.	Scenario I – US Branch B’s tax books are kept in US dollars	176
3.4.4.3.	Scenario II – US Branch B’s tax books are kept in euro	182
3.4.4.4.	Scenario III – US Branch B’s tax books are kept in Japanese yen	184
3.5.	The route to Rome: Taxing the fraction	188
3.5.1.	If the Dutch tax legislator had applied the Dutch-style double tax relief mechanism non-discriminatively, it would have enhanced fairness, but it did not...	188
3.5.1.1.	The system itself operates equitably and efficiently, as the tax burden is untouched by border crossings	188
3.5.1.2.	Common to international taxation practices, the system is, however, only available to Dutch resident taxpayers; non-resident taxpayers receive different tax treatment	189
3.5.1.3.	Notwithstanding its alignment to international taxation, the difference in tax treatment is essentially unfair	190
3.5.2.	The difference in tax treatment of resident taxpayers and non-resident taxpayers should end	196
3.5.2.1.	So what we need is ...	196
3.5.2.2.	... unlimited tax liability upon domestic nexus and Dutch-style double tax relief for foreign nexus	196
3.5.3.	The operation of the advocated system: Taxing the fraction	198
3.5.3.1.	The tax burden is exactly the same in both domestic and cross-border environments	198
3.5.3.2.	Communicating vessels: Foreign and domestic-source losses; cross-border loss set-off	200
3.5.3.3.	Communicating vessels: Notional services provided, notional supplies of goods (stock and capital assets)	210
3.5.3.4.	Currency exchange results	217
3.5.4.	Not all distortions would be resolved...	227
3.5.4.1.	Analysis builds on assumption of absence of disparities	227
3.5.4.2.	Analysis builds on assumption of adequate building blocks of international taxation	228

## Table of Contents

---

3.5.5.	... but distortions due to obstacles would be	228
3.5.5.1.	Discriminations and restrictions internal to the international tax systems of nation states would be eliminated	228
3.5.5.2.	Van Raad's "fractional taxation" and the resident taxpayer treatment of non-resident taxpayers individuals in Dutch individual income taxation	229
3.5.5.3.	Tax parity of residents and non-residents is attainable: It is also done in value added taxation	233
3.5.5.4.	Advocated system in treaty scenarios: Administrative assistance called for	234
3.5.5.5.	Switch-over to credit mechanism to counter potential for tax abuse	235
3.6.	The Court of Justice's alternative, pragmatic route to Rome: The territoriality principle	237
3.6.1.	The Court of Justice seeks equilibrium between Member State tax sovereignty and the fundamental freedoms	237
3.6.1.1.	Pragmatically balancing tax sovereignty and the free movement rights: The territoriality principle to justify an obstacle imposed	237
3.6.1.2.	Doing the sums would lead to the same point as the approach advocated in this book	239
3.6.2.	The Court of Justice's pragmatic interpretations have however produced ambiguities	240
3.6.2.1.	The Court of Justice's reasoning has been ambivalent	240
3.6.2.2.	"Territoriality effectively achieved suffices"	240
3.6.2.3.	Territoriality effectively achieved is insufficient: It should be achieved efficiently	242
3.6.2.4.	Dislocations thus sometimes upheld and sometimes struck down	243
3.6.3.	Legal uncertainty is the product of the Court of Justice's case law	243
3.6.3.1.	Lack of clarity in how the Court of Justice's rulings mutually relate	243
3.6.3.2.	Relying on the Court of Justice's observations or taking an autonomous course?	244
3.7.	Final remarks	245

<b>Part IV</b>		
<b>Towards a Fair International Tax Regime: Eliminating Disparities Adequately</b>		
<b>Chapter 4:</b>	<b>The Group as a Taxable Entity</b>	<b>251</b>
4.1.	Introduction	251
4.2.	The multinational firm: A rents-producing single economic entity	254
4.2.1.	Multinational firms economically exist as single entities	254
4.2.2.	Multinational firms derive economic rents: The “theory of the firm”	256
4.2.3.	This explains the unitary-business approach in international tax theory	259
4.3.	Tax consolidation remedies the separate-entity approach’s distortive features	260
4.3.1.	Seeking to capture multinationals for corporate tax purposes	260
4.3.1.1.	Taxing multinationals on the basis of a common tool: The separate-entity approach	260
4.3.1.2.	The separate-entity approach produces arbitrage	260
4.3.1.3.	Some elaboration: Distortive effects render the separate-entity approach inefficient and inequitable	262
4.3.1.4.	Countering the arbitrage: Tax consolidation	263
4.4.	Tax consolidation regimes do not adequately cover the economic entity: An alternative	274
4.4.1.	Reconsidering the scope of application of the typical tax consolidation regimes	274
4.4.2.	Remedying distortive effects in a domestic context	274
4.4.2.1.	Decisive influence	274
4.4.2.2.	Motive: The corporate interest granting the parent decisive influence should be held as a capital asset	281
4.4.2.3.	Equivalent approach to decide on applicable fundamental freedom in primary EU law?	294
4.4.3.	Remedying distortive effects in a cross-border context: Subject group to unlimited tax liability and provide double tax relief by means of credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income	296

## Table of Contents

---

4.4.3.1.	Typically no cross-border tax consolidation is available	296
4.4.3.2.	Categorizing the ineligibilities to cross-border tax consolidation	298
4.4.3.3.	Eligibility depends on tax residence and investment location: Differential upon tax border crossing	300
4.4.3.4.	Fairness requires worldwide cross-border tax consolidation akin to worldwide unitary combination	302
4.4.3.5.	Worldwide taxation in the event of a domestic nexus: Double tax relief in the form of a credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income regarding a foreign nexus	304
4.4.3.6.	Advocated system in treaty scenarios: Administrative assistance called for	306
4.4.3.7.	Switch-over to credit mechanism to counter potential for tax abuse	307
4.5.	Consequences	309
4.5.1.	Weighing the pros and cons: The pros	309
4.5.1.1.	The system would enhance fairness	309
4.5.1.2.	The system would be obstacle-free	309
4.5.1.3.	The system would operate invariantly regarding the legal organization of the firm: No paper profit-shifting incentives through intra-firm legal structuring	311
4.5.2.	Weighing the pros and cons: The cons	321
4.5.2.1.	Tax-transparency of subsidiary companies and hybrid entity mismatch issues	321
4.5.2.2.	Triangular cases and currency exchange rate mutations	322
4.5.2.3.	Profit attribution by reference to the OECD's two-step analysis	324
4.5.2.4.	Tax return filing, auditing and mutual administrative assistance	325
4.5.3.	Remaining challenges to be resolved	327
4.5.3.1.	Obstacles imposed abroad still in place	327
4.5.3.2.	Disparities and inadequacies in the tax base definition methodologies still in place	327
4.5.3.3.	Disparities and inadequacies in the profit division methodologies still in place	328

4.5.4.	Remaining challenges do not render the current analysis invalid	330
4.6.	Final remarks	330
<b>Chapter 5:</b>	<b>Economic Rents as a Taxable Base</b>	<b>333</b>
5.1.	Introduction	333
5.2.	Business income as remuneration for the production factor of enterprise	336
5.2.1.	What is business income? The S-H-S concept of income	336
5.2.2.	Taxing the returns to the production factor of enterprise: Economic rents	338
5.2.2.1.	Taxing the business proceeds ...	338
5.2.2.2.	... of the firm involved	339
5.3.	No-tax environment	341
5.3.1.	Assessing the investment returns of Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company	341
5.3.2.	The benchmark: Investment returns of Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company in a no-tax environment	342
5.3.3.	Leverage explained	343
5.3.4.	Operating through interposed subsidiary Johnson's Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.	345
5.3.5.	The alternative business opportunity: (In)direct investment in the dinghy distribution business of a third party	345
5.4.	Problematic effects under conventional corporate income tax	346
5.4.1.	General remarks	346
5.4.1.1.	Introducing a typical corporate tax into the model	346
5.4.1.2.	Nominal return on equity	346
5.4.1.3.	Realization basis	347
5.4.1.4.	Tax depreciation	348
5.4.2.	The effects involving a direct investment	349
5.4.2.1.	Assessing the investment returns of Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company	349
5.4.2.2.	Average effective tax rates: The "tax wedge"	351

## Table of Contents

---

5.4.2.3.	Financing discrimination: Distorting financing decisions	354
5.4.2.4.	Marginal effective tax rates: Distortions at the margin	356
5.4.3.	The effects that arise when it involves an (in)direct investment through an interposed controlled subsidiary	357
5.4.3.1.	Assessing the investment returns through interposed subsidiary Johnson's Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.	357
5.4.3.2.	The effects of the deviation between the corporate income tax reality and actual reality are significant	358
5.4.3.3.	Tax consolidation remedies	368
5.4.4.	The effects involving an indirect investment in a non-controlled participation	369
5.4.4.1.	General remarks	369
5.4.4.2.	Mitigating tax cascading: Participation exemption and indirect credit regimes operate inequitably	371
5.4.4.3.	An equitable alternative to mitigate tax cascading: The "indirect tax exemption"	380
5.4.4.4.	Loss recapture and profit carry-forward mechanisms required	387
5.4.4.5.	Yet core issues remain in place, so we need something else	398
5.5.	Problematic effects under comprehensive business income tax	399
5.5.1.	General remarks	399
5.5.1.1.	A CBIT taxes EBIT	399
5.5.1.2.	Creating tax parity in financing by denying deduction for debt financing	399
5.5.2.	The effects involving a direct investment	401
5.5.2.1.	Assessing the investment returns of Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company	401
5.5.2.2.	Average effective tax rates: The tax wedge	403
5.5.2.3.	Financing discrimination issues mitigated	405
5.5.2.4.	Marginal effective tax rates – The price: Distortions at the margin	406
5.5.3.	We need something else	408
5.6.	Towards fairness: The allowance for corporate equity	409
5.6.1.	General remarks	409
5.6.1.1.	An ACE taxes rents	409

5.6.1.2.	Creating tax parity in financing by granting deduction for equity financing	409
5.6.2.	The effects involving a direct investment	410
5.6.2.1.	Assessing the investment returns of Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company	410
5.6.2.2.	Equal-to-statutory AETRs	413
5.6.2.3.	Financing discrimination issues mitigated	416
5.6.2.4.	Marginal effective tax rates are nil	419
5.6.2.5.	Arguments for further exploration	420
5.6.3.	The effects that arise when an (in)direct investment through an interposed controlled subsidiary is involved	422
5.6.3.1.	Assessing the investment returns through interposed subsidiary Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.	422
5.6.3.2.	Tax consolidation remedies	423
5.6.4.	The effects involving an indirect investment in a non-controlled participation	424
5.6.4.1.	General remarks	424
5.6.4.2.	Mitigating tax cascading: The indirect tax exemption under an ACE	425
5.6.4.3.	Loss recapture and profit carry-forward mechanisms required	430
5.7.	Effects under cash flow taxes	440
5.7.1.	General	440
5.7.1.1.	Inbound and outbound cash flows are taxable events	440
5.7.1.2.	Cash flow taxes in three variations	441
5.7.2.	Effects under real transactions-based cash flow tax	443
5.7.2.1.	General remarks	443
5.7.2.2.	The effects involving a direct investment	444
5.7.2.3.	Average effective tax rates are nil: Property comes at a price	446
5.7.2.4.	Financing discrimination issues prove not to be resolved	451
5.7.2.5.	Marginal effective tax rates are nil	453
5.7.2.6.	Fixing the “government’s silent partnership” and “financing discrimination” properties	453
5.7.3.	Effects under real and financial transactions-based or share-based cash flow tax	459
5.7.3.1.	General remarks	459
5.7.3.2.	The effects involving a direct investment	461

## Table of Contents

---

5.7.3.3.	Average effective tax rates are nil: Property comes at a price	463
5.7.3.4.	Financing discrimination issues mitigated	468
5.7.3.5.	Marginal effective tax rates are nil	470
5.7.3.6.	Fixing the “government’s silent partnership” feature	470
5.7.3.7.	Reinforcing tax depreciation?	476
5.8.	Final remarks	480
<b>Chapter 6:</b>	<b>In Search of an Allocation Mechanism</b>	<b>483</b>
6.1.	Introduction	483
6.2.	Income lacks geographical attributes	486
6.2.1.	Identification of the “true geographical source of income” seems required, but the theoretical rationale is non-existent	486
6.2.2.	From net value added at origin to net value added at destination	488
6.2.2.1.	Supply side of income (firm inputs) and demand side of income (firm outputs)	488
6.2.2.2.	Supply side of income: Taxing at origin	489
6.2.2.3.	Demand side of income: Taxing at destination	492
6.2.2.4.	Income as a result of the interplay of supply and demand	495
6.2.2.5.	Taxing income at destination: Strange?	498
6.2.3.	Nothing definitive to be said on geographical location of income, but agreement necessary	500
6.2.3.1.	Locating income: No conceptual benchmark available for rule making	500
6.2.3.2.	“Slicing the shadow”: Agreement seems to be required, but on what?	504
6.3.	Tax pie sharing under the supply-side profit attribution system in international taxation: Why it fails	508
6.3.1.	Current international tax system aims at locating and evaluating firm inputs but falls short	508
6.3.2.	Current international tax system fosters profit shifting as a consequence	509

6.3.3.	Nexus in international taxation: Why only “significant people functions” has some appeal for locating income at origin	512
6.3.3.1.	Nexus required to establish taxable presence, but instruments are often arbitrary	512
6.3.3.2.	Broken nexus concepts: Corporate nationality, corporate residence and the permanent establishment threshold	512
6.3.3.2.1.	Broken nexus concepts in international tax law	512
6.3.3.2.2.	The sheer meaninglessness of corporate nationality (incorporation seat system)	513
6.3.3.2.3.	The shallowness of corporate residence (real-seat system; place of effective management)	516
6.3.3.2.4.	<i>Situs</i> , perhaps, but many of its expressions in international taxation have reached breaking points	523
6.3.3.3.	<i>Situs</i> , perhaps indeed, but only by reference to “significant people”	532
6.3.3.4.	Significant people: All the multinational’s employees, calling for the “labour factor presence test”	538
6.3.4.	Allocation in international taxation: Why SA/ALS fails	541
6.3.4.1.	Allocation required to evaluate taxable presence	541
6.3.4.2.	Transfer pricing: A world of smoke (SA) and mirrors (ALS) causing the “continuum price problem”	542
6.3.4.2.1.	A “universe of pretense”	542
6.3.4.2.2.	Fiction one: The smoke – The multinational firm is a single entity in reality, yet SA in taxation is the standard	543
6.3.4.2.3.	The consequence: A potential for arbitrage	545
6.3.4.2.4.	Fiction two: The mirrors – ALS to counter arbitrage potential created, yet in reality firms derive rents	548
6.3.4.2.5.	The consequence: The continuum price problem	551
6.3.4.3.	Recognizing the continuum price problem in transfer pricing trends: Towards “residual profit splitting”	562
6.3.4.3.1.	Evolution in transfer pricing methods reveals a shaking-off of the traditional SA/ALS concept	562
6.3.4.3.2.	Blowing away the smoke: Towards “combined profit”	565
6.3.4.3.3.	Breaking the mirrors: Approximating “relative contributions of functions performed”	574

## Table of Contents

---

6.3.4.4.	But how to objectively evaluate the fair value of firm inputs at origin?	577
6.3.4.5.	Perhaps tax allocation should not rely on subjective beliefs regarding future earnings	583
6.3.4.6.	Perhaps tax allocation should rely on predetermined formulae: Towards formulary apportionment	586
6.4.	Tax pie sharing under the supply-demand and demand-side alternatives: Formulary apportionment	590
6.4.1.	Traditional FA aims at fairly approximating the location and value of firm inputs at origin and firm outputs at destination	590
6.4.2.	Formulary apportionment systems: The United States, Canada and the CCCTB	592
6.4.2.1.	Some well-known examples	592
6.4.2.2.	Formulary apportionment in US state income taxation: A glance	593
6.4.2.3.	Formulary allocation in the Canadian provincial/territorial tax system: A glance	596
6.4.2.4.	Formulary apportionment in the European Union under the proposed CCCTB: A glance	597
6.4.3.	The virtues of common and theoretically sound approaches: Also under FA	600
6.4.3.1.	FA is about profit division, not about tax unit definitions, tax base definitions or double tax relief mechanisms	600
6.4.3.2.	A common approach: Also under FA	601
6.4.3.3.	Unlimited taxation, Dutch-style double tax relief: Also under FA	604
6.4.3.4.	Economic rent taxation: Also under FA	606
6.4.3.5.	The group as a taxable entity: Also under FA	606
6.4.3.6.	Favouring worldwide unitary combination over water's edge limitation	613
6.4.4.	FA does not put to an end real profit shifting but could end paper profit shifting if well designed	620
6.4.4.1.	FA seeks to approximate location of income by locating income-generating activities	620
6.4.4.2.	The formula factors and their effects further assessed	624
6.4.4.2.1.	Nexus and allocation: Also required in FA	624

6.4.4.2.2.	A plea for coordinating nexus and allocation standards in line with inputs and outputs through “factor presence tests”	625
6.4.4.2.3.	Exploring suitable proxies for locating and evaluating firm inputs and firm outputs	644
6.4.5.	Deciding on the matter: Towards destination-based sales-only apportionment	676
6.4.5.1.	The effects of apportioning to input locations and output locations: Real profit shifting	676
6.4.5.2.	Towards destination-based sales-only apportionment	685
6.4.5.3.	The effects of currency exchange results under the advocated system	690
6.4.5.4.	Simplifying matters: Multiplying the firm’s worldwide rents with domestic sales over worldwide sales ratio	704
6.4.6.	Rate coordination, revenue sharing? Perhaps not	706
6.5.	Final remarks	711

Part V

Sharing the Pie: The Building Blocks of a Corporate Tax 2.0

<b>Chapter 7:</b>	<b>Conclusions: The Building Blocks of a Fair International Tax Regime</b>	717
7.1.	The issue	717
7.2.	The central research question and the key subquestions	718
7.2.1.	Central research question: How should the business proceeds of multinationals be taxed?	718
7.2.2.	Key subquestions: Towards fairness in corporate taxation in three steps	718
7.3.	Sharing the pie: Building blocks of a fair international tax regime	719
7.3.1.	Some thoughts on fairness in corporate taxation: A normative framework built on the equality principle	719

## Table of Contents

---

7.3.2.	Towards a fair international tax regime – Eliminating obstacles: Worldwide taxation in the event of a domestic nexus; double tax relief in the form of a credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income regarding a foreign nexus	721
7.3.3.	Towards a fair international tax regime: Eliminating disparities adequately	723
7.3.3.1.	Whom to tax, what to tax and where to tax it?	723
7.3.3.2.	Whom to tax? The group as a taxable entity	723
7.3.3.3.	What to tax? Economic rents as taxable base	725
7.3.3.4.	Where to tax? Destination-based sales-only apportionment	726
7.3.4.	Sharing the pie: Building blocks of a corporate tax 2.0	729
<b>References</b>		<b>731</b>