
Humanitarian Military Intervention

The Conditions for Success and Failure

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Contents

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| <i>Preface to the paperback edition</i> | <i>vii</i> |
| <i>Preface to the hardback edition</i> | <i>viii</i> |
| <i>Acknowledgements</i> | <i>x</i> |
| <i>Abbreviations and acronyms</i> | <i>xi</i> |
| <i>Map 1. Northern Iraq, 1992</i> | <i>xiii</i> |
| <i>Map 2. Somalia</i> | <i>xiv</i> |
| <i>Map 3. Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 1995</i> | <i>xv</i> |
| <i>Map 4. Rwanda, August 1994</i> | <i>xvi</i> |
| <i>Map 5. Kosovo, 1999</i> | <i>xvii</i> |
| <i>Map 6. East Timor, 1999</i> | <i>xviii</i> |
| 1. Controversies about humanitarian military intervention | 1 |
| I. Humanitarian intervention debates | 7 |
| II. The structure of this book | 28 |
| 2. Judging success and failure | 30 |
| I. What is success? | 30 |
| II. Counting people who did not die | 32 |
| III. A typology of humanitarian military intervention | 38 |
| IV. Summary | 45 |
| Figure 2.1. Military responses to humanitarian dilemmas | 40 |
| Table 2.1. A typology of humanitarian military intervention | 42 |
| 3. Humanitarian military interventions in the 1990s | 46 |
| I. State oppression of the Kurds in northern Iraq, 1991–96 | 47 |
| II. State failure and famine in Somalia, 1991–95 | 52 |
| III. Secession and ethnic expulsion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992–95 | 61 |
| IV. Genocide and civil war in Rwanda, 1994 | 70 |
| V. Secessionist violence and ethnic expulsion in Kosovo, 1999 | 78 |
| VI. Independence and fear in East Timor, 1999–2000 | 86 |
| VII. Summary | 93 |
| Table 3.1. The impact of intervention in northern Iraq, 1991–96 | 48 |
| Table 3.2. The impact of intervention in Somalia, 1991–95 | 60 |
| Table 3.3. The impact of intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992–95 | 68 |
| Table 3.4. The impact of intervention in Rwanda, 1994 | 78 |
| Table 3.5. The impact of intervention in Kosovo, 1999–2000 | 80 |
| Table 3.6. The impact of intervention in East Timor, 1999–2000 | 90 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 4. Helping to deliver emergency aid | 96 |
| I. Strategies for delivering aid | 97 |
| II. Direct aid and logistics provision in the 1990s | 106 |
| III. Advantages and disadvantages of military intervention to help provide aid | 131 |
| IV. Summary | 133 |
| Table 4.1. Variations of direct aid and logistical assistance | 106 |
| 5. Protecting humanitarian aid operations | 135 |
| I. Strategies for protecting aid operations | 136 |
| II. Protecting aid operations in the 1990s | 145 |
| III. Advantages and disadvantages of military intervention to protect aid operations | 172 |
| IV. Summary | 176 |
| Table 5.1. Various forms of military protection of aid operations | 140 |
| 6. Saving the victims of violence | 177 |
| I. Strategies for protecting civilians | 180 |
| II. Saving the victims of violence in the 1990s | 191 |
| III. Advantages and disadvantages of military intervention to save the victims of violence | 218 |
| IV. Summary | 220 |
| Table 6.1. Various forms of saving civilian victims | 184 |
| 7. Defeating the perpetrators of violence | 222 |
| I. Strategies for defeating the perpetrators of violence | 224 |
| II. Defeating the perpetrators of violence in the 1990s | 230 |
| III. Advantages and disadvantages of military intervention to defeat the perpetrators of violence | 262 |
| IV. Summary | 265 |
| Table 7.1. Various outcomes of offensive action to defeat perpetrators of violence | 226 |
| 8. The prospects for success and the limits of humanitarian intervention | 267 |
| I. Taking stock | 270 |
| II. Choosing among types and strategies | 274 |
| III. The limits of humanitarian military intervention | 276 |
| IV. Concluding comments | 280 |
| Table 8.1. Success and failure in humanitarian military intervention in the 1990s | 272 |
| Index | 282 |