

# A GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TAX AVOIDANCE DIRECTIVE

*Edited by*

**WERNER HASLEHNER**

*Professor of Law, ATOZ Chair for European and International Taxation,  
University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg*

**KATERINA PANTAZATOU**

*Associate Professor of Tax Law, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg*

**GEORG KOFLER**

*Professor of Law, Institute for Fiscal Law, Tax Law and Tax Policy,  
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria*

**ALEXANDER RUST**

*Professor of Tax Law, Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law,  
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria*

**ELGAR TAX LAW AND PRACTICE**

 **Edward Elgar**  
PUBLISHING

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

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*Bart van Raaij*

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