

Free Will

An Introduction

Helen Beebee

Samuel Hall Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester, UK

palgrave
macmillan

Contents

<i>Series Editor's Preface</i>	vii
<i>Preface</i>	ix
1 Free Will: The Basics	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Determinism v. indeterminism	11
1.3 Determinism, indeterminism and causation	16
1.4 The Consequence Argument	17
1.5 Sourcehood and manipulation arguments	19
1.6 Conclusion	22
2 What Does Acting Freely Require? Some Compatibilist Views	24
2.1 Introduction	24
2.2 Compatibilist control and reasons-responsiveness	26
2.3 Dennett's 'personal stance'	32
2.4 Reactive attitudes	35
2.5 Frankfurt's hierarchical model	38
2.6 Conclusion	45
3 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument	47
3.1 Introduction	47
3.2 What does 'could have done otherwise' mean?	49
3.3 Dennett on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities	55
3.4 Local miracle compatibilism	58
3.5 Humean compatibilism	64
3.6 Conclusion	75
4 Compatibilism, Sourcehood, and Manipulation Arguments	78
4.1 Introduction	78
4.2 Sourcehood and manipulation	78
4.3 Pereboom's four-case argument	82
4.4 Some responses to the four-case argument	85
4.5 The zygote argument	97
4.6 Conclusion	99

5	What Does Acting Freely Require? Some Incompatibilist Views	101
5.1	Introduction	101
5.2	Indeterministic initiators	105
5.3	Leeway incompatibilism	108
5.4	Source incompatibilism	112
5.5	The problem of luck	117
5.6	Agent-causalism	120
5.7	Libertarianism	124
5.8	Pessimism	129
5.9	Conclusion	134
6	Frankfurt's Nefarious Neurosurgeon	136
6.1	Introduction	136
6.2	The Frankfurt case	139
6.3	Frankfurt's analysis of the case	140
6.4	Incompatibilist responses to Frankfurt	145
6.5	The dilemma defence	146
6.6	The flicker defence	150
6.7	Weak source incompatibilism and weak agent-causalism	155
6.8	The <i>W</i> -defence	161
6.9	Could Jones really not have done otherwise?	163
6.10	Conclusion	165
7	Other Issues	167
7.1	Introduction	167
7.2	Free will and foreknowledge	167
7.3	Free will and neuroscience	171
7.4	Free will, intuitions and experimental philosophy	173
7.5	What <i>is</i> moral responsibility anyway?	180
7.6	Conclusion	183
	<i>Bibliography</i>	184
	<i>Index</i>	189