

Conversation and Responsibility

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CONTENTS

Preface ix

Introduction: Moral Responsibility, Conversation, and Meaning 1

1. Moral Responsibility: A Conceptual Map 6
 1. Kinds of Responsibility 7
 2. Morally Responsible Agency 9
 3. Moral Responsibility for Conduct 14
 4. Holding Morally Responsible 21
 5. Moral Responsibility, Entailment, and the Concept of Moral Responsibility 29
2. Reorienting Strawson's Theory of Moral Responsibility 31
 1. Variations on Strawson's Theory 31
 2. Embracing and Developing Wallace's Principle (N) 34
 3. A Normative Interpretation versus an Extreme Metaphysical Interpretation 39
 4. Two Distinctions 45
 5. Resisting a Strawsonian Theme: The Role of Holding Responsible 46
 6. A Modest Metaphysical Interpretation 50
3. Moral Responsibility and Quality of Will 56
 1. A Strawsonian Quality of Will Thesis 57
 2. The Morally Reactive Attitudes and Their Attendant Practices 64
 3. Pleas: Reasons to Modify the Reactive Attitudes 74
 - 3.1 Excuses and Justifications 74
 - 3.2 Exemptions 75
4. Conversation and Responsibility 79
 1. The Intimate Link between Being Responsible and Holding Responsible 80

2. Introducing a Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility	88
3. Agent Meaning and Moral Responsibility	92
4. Agent Meaning and Action Meaning	94
5. What Kind of Meaning Is Agent Meaning?	96
6. The Place of Meaning in Other Theories of Responsibility	101
5. Genuine Responsibility: Defending a Conversational Theory	105
1. A Robinson Crusoe–Type Objection	105
2. Why Affect?	110
3. Moral Responsibility <i>without</i> Desert?	114
4. Moral Responsibility <i>with</i> Desert?	120
4.1 Basic Desert	121
4.2 Ultimate Responsibility and What Is Deserved	122
4.3 Axiological, Deontological, or Both?	123
6. Conversation and Deserved Blame	127
1. In Search of a Desert Thesis	128
2. What’s the Harm in Blaming?	134
3. Articulating a Desert Thesis for Blame	141
4. A Challenge for the Moral Responsibility Skeptic	146
7. Blame’s Warrant	149
1. The Challenge of Proper Warrant	150
2. Justifying Blame in the Absence of Desert	154
3. Justifying Blame by Way of Nonbasic Desert	161
4. Why Not Basic Desert?	164
5. Accounting for Blame’s Warrant	171
8. Conversation and the Scope of Moral Responsibility	173
1. Blaming in the Absence of the Blamed	174
2. A Restrictive View of Moral Responsibility’s Scope	179
3. Blameworthiness for Bad Acts?	182
4. Blameworthiness for the Nonvoluntary?	187
5. Conversation and a Unified Account of Moral Responsibility’s Scope	195
9. Conclusion	205
Bibliography	229
Index	235