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*Luc Peeperkorn and Vincent Verouden*

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*Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, and Hans Zenger*

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## 5. Mergers

*Claes Bengtsson, Josep Maria Carpi Badia, and Massimiliano Kadar*

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## II SPECIFIC PRACTICES

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*Matthew Bennett, Francisco Enrique González Díaz, Henning Leupold,  
Anna Vernet, and Donnadh Woods*

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## 8. Cartels

*Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, and Ewoud Sakkers*

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#### IV STATE AID

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*Tim Maxian Rusche, Claire Micheau, Henri Piffaut, and Koen Van de Castele*

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