

# Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
Introduction	1
<b>Part I. Sensory Consciousness</b>	
1. The Manifest Image of Sensory Consciousness	9
1.1 Introspection, 'diaphanous' experience, and the relation of perceptual acquaintance	12
1.2 Representational content and the properties of conscious experience	17
1.3 The re-emergence of relational views	23
1.4 Articulating the manifest image of sensory consciousness	25
2. Occurrence, State, Content, and Character	27
2.1 The temporal profiles of thought and experience	28
2.2 Geach on the discontinuous character of thought	30
2.3 The ontology of the stream of consciousness	34
2.4 Representational content and the ontology of experience	38
2.5 Representational content and phenomenal character	42
2.6 An ontological proposal: occurrence, state, and explanatory circularity	45
2.7 The interdependence thesis	50
3. The Phenomenology and Ontology of Bodily Sensation	53
3.1 The phenomenology of pain	54
3.2 A phenomenological puzzle	58
3.3 An ontology that fits the phenomenology	61
3.4 Bodily sensation, transparency, and intentionality	67
3.5 Mind-dependent bodily events and the biological function of pain	70
3.6 Explanatory circularity and physicalism	76
3.7 Hallucinating phenomenal events	79
4. Temporal Transparency and Perceptual Acquaintance	83
4.1 Representation and the perceptual relation: what is in dispute?	84
4.2 The temporal transparency of our experience of events	88
4.3 Representationalism and the temporal transparency of experience	90
4.4 The ontological challenge	92
4.5 The ontological challenge illustrated: two puzzles	95
4.6 A relationalist proposal	99
4.7 An ontological resolution	102
4.8 The problem of hallucination	107

5. Structural Features of Perceptual Acquaintance	111
5.1 Bodily awareness, vision, and the spatial sensory field	115
5.2 Hearing silence and the temporal sensory field	123
5.3 Perceptual perspectives on space and time: a structural difference	130
6. Conscious Contact with Time and the Continuity of Consciousness	135
6.1 Conscious contact with time in the state of wakeful consciousness	135
6.2 'Occurrent' perceptual states and experiencing the 'passage' of time	138
6.3 Occurrent perceptual states and Dennett's 'multiple drafts'	143
6.4 The diachronic unity and continuity of consciousness	147
6.5 The ontology of the manifest image of conscious sensory experience	152
7. Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Recollection	155
7.1 Perceptual imagination and perceptual experience: the 'same but different' puzzle	156
7.2 The dependency thesis	159
7.3 The ontology of perceptual imagination	163
7.4 Perceptual memory and episodic recollection	169
7.5 Perceptual imagination and knowing what it's like	178
8. Introspection and Knowing What It's Like	181
8.1 Introspecting 'transparent' experience	183
8.2 Noticing, looking at, and watching	186
8.3 The introspective perspective on experience and our perceptual perspective on the world	192
8.4 A relationalist response to the problem of hallucination	198
8.5 The ontology of knowing the phenomenology	206
 <b>Part II. Conscious Thinking</b>	
9. The Place of Mental Action in the Metaphysics of Mind	211
9.1 'Cartesian' and 'anti-Cartesian' approaches	211
9.2 The place of mental action in accounts of agency	218
9.3 O'Shaughnessy on consciousness and mental action	219
9.4 Questions and issues	224
10. The Ontology of Conscious Thinking	227
10.1 The privacy of conscious thinking	228
10.2 A 'bottom-up' approach to conscious thinking, and the temporal profile of the conscious act of judging	232
10.3 Thinking out loud	238
10.4 Thinking and talking	243
10.5 The ontology of conscious judgement	246
10.6 Is there a stream of conscious thought?	251

11. ‘The Mind Uses Its Own Freedom’: Suppositional Reasoning and Self-Critical Reflection	257
11.1 Suppositional reasoning	259
11.2 Self-critical reflection and bracketing belief	265
11.3 Locating the agency in suppositional reasoning and self-critical reflection	271
12. Mental Action, Autonomy, and the Perspective of Practical Reason	275
12.1 Agential activity, autonomous action, and mental action	276
12.2 Bratman and Velleman on intention	281
12.3 Decision, planning, and assumption	284
12.4 Decision and memory	289
12.5 Epistemic freedom and the perspective of practical reason	291
12.6 Decision and mental agency	296
12.7 Decision, practical deliberation, and autonomous agency	299
13. Intention-in-Action and the Epistemology of Mind	309
13.1 Intention-in-action and practical self-knowledge	309
13.2 Intention-in-action and the epistemology of mental action	316
13.3 States of consciousness, the ‘mental will’, and a hypothesis about dreams	323
14. Reconsidering the Place of Mental Action in the Metaphysics of Mind	333
14.1 The place and role of mental agency in an account of conscious thinking	333
14.2 The epistemology of mental action and scepticism directed at conscious thinking	336
14.3 The place of mental action in the metaphysics of mind	341
15. Thinking and Belief	347
15.1 Knowing what you are thinking and knowing what you believe	348
15.2 Thinking, belief revision, and epistemic traps	355
15.3 Losing knowledge through self-critical reflection	362
15.4 Multiplying the epistemic options: epistemic liberty and the ethics of belief	366
<i>References</i>	371
<i>Index</i>	383